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BRIEF

OF CASE

for pt>rsonal injuries sus~·.... \l·ni .• · ndinj;! a~ a pa."St>nger in an automo. r (.,r.itt'li o~· her husband which collided with
\r::nn by plaintiff

Dl~Jli 1:-:ITIO\'

I\' U l\\'ER l'OURT

T'.i<' Jury rt>turnt•d an unanimous verdict in
A·· r ·i tht· plaintiff upon
which judgment was
'..#~: by tnt' Court after a stipulated reduction
·~.... .l'Ylount of special damages awarded.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT 11~ APPE.-\L
Affinnance of tlw j udgnJt·n:
entered on the jury \·erdict.

f

I,

th1· ti'

'•j

•ll,

.

(11 ')•

STATEME>:T UF F ..\CT~
Respondent agrt>t:·s gt:·nt.·rallv wirn· a ..
.
•
PPt11ar.-,
state?1~nt ?f fact~ w1 th thP following exceptiiin~ d"
am phf ica t10n.
·
The shoulder of the highway immuliau. 1\ ::.,r
of the pole showing the "Coach Stop" m~.rk.er 1;.:.
wet and somewhat muddy, but was not soft ord!"t'p~·
rutted ( R. 292). The rub referred tll by ap~*'.l<:~
were in an area in front of the Concrete Block Hou..;.
(Ex. 10) across the driveway and approxima:e>
25 to 30 feet north of the pole bearing the "C<lae
Stop" sign ( R. 292, 295 & Ex. 6). The shouldf'
area was composed of a mixture of gra\'el. cinae:,
and dirt ( R. 218 & 295) and there were no phy~il.'J.
objects which would have preventfd thP bu~ ctrn,:r
from pulling off the highway and onto the shou:dtr
area (R. 128).
The bus driver avoided stopping on the sh1)ulde;
of the highway because of his concern that the pa..'sengers not get their feet wet rather than being at·
prehensive that the bus would get stuck (R. 179 ~
197). He at no time pulled off the highway (R. lt
& Ex. 10).
The bus driver did not remember ever sw~
ping at this particular "stop" before ( R. 15~ &

definite understanding as to where
.
.
" 1.111ncr to ~·top with relat10nsh1p to the pole
··a~:· ~Coach Stop" marker (R. 156), and in
·: \'. Lht '· ,,. ,,·h~t he intended to do with refer.::11 n11! J\ll'1 .
' , .
- . 1·1 • wa..: gomg to stop (R. 160). How. , •r:w1 t· t
• ~
· ". · ·Jenera! practice of bus drivers on that
:·. ~;:;=- ~u 1,u!l off llnto the shoulder of the high... ~ far a:' 1,0 ssible immediately south o~ t~e pole
::<:~l! :h, "Cnach Stop" mark:r whe~ p1ckmg up
.::J'ha!·g-ing passengers at this locatwn (R. 216,

Ht !ia( l Ill'

.

.. '

\.\

-- - ---

·)·l(I

o)•}'))

nt bus driver

.

gave no arm and hand signal
: :.;~ !nt2ntion to stop ( R. 163) ; nor does he re·lmt>:ir :1tcuating the brake light by means of the
·'akr pt>dal at any time in advance of when he ac.i3:ly ~tarted to stop ( R. 163). He claims to have
:,.;,Jr an unorthodox signal of his intention to stop
!. :urning on the right-turn signal marker which is
:~mall light with an arrow in it at the rear of the
··is 1Ex. i), but his assumption that he did so is
~:ad~ on the basis that this is the "general pracand the bus company "requires" it (R. 164).
j. s12ted he "believes" that he would have turned
: on when he started to stop. ( R. 189).
.-:i:_ ..

The bus brake lights and the rear end of the bus
:r~~raliy were covered with a film of grime and
::-i from the wet roadway (R. 200 - 201 & 246).
to the. accident he had cleaned the headlights
•.d wmdshield of the bus but did not clean the

;nr

3

brake lights at the rear of the bu;-; 1. RI.. ·)- 11,1.
, .
lq1
No one checked after thP ac"'Cident to , .; ·
11
brake lights when illuminated could bt· --~e ·~..
h
.,..,n a: ar·
distance to t e rear of the hus in the dan h ~·
N . h
h
·
. ig t •
201 &• 3 11 ) .... e1t er t e plaintiff nor ner h "ba ..
who had thei1· a tten ti on drawn spf'('ifiealh·~., '.·_·
rear of the bus when it changed lant>s in ·fr ·.·.
1
them ( R. 226 - 2~7 & 255 - 256) and aga\n :. ~tt·~
they n~ticed that the bus was stopping immt>diatt ..·
before impact ( R. 230 & 257). saw any illurninati ..
from the brake lights or the turn signal light. '
11

The bus dri ,·er was not aware of any traffa
behind him before the accident occurred (R. 17.)i
However, when he heard the sound of tires skiddir.(
behind the bus, he looked into his rear \iew mirrrr
and saw without difficulty the automobile slidin:
toward the bus ( R. 176).
Mrs. Stapley never said in her deposition tha:
she saw "brake lights". The term was used by dt-fendant's counsel and was misunderstood by :M~.
Stapley as "back lights." She identified which "tiaci
lights" by correction of her deposition and at tri1:
(R. 276 - 281). The bus driver stated that the "!'u:-.·
ning lights" or "back light" allegedly seen by .MrStapley were used only at night and he did not tlun.~:
they were "on" because there was no reason tL• har·
them Hon" ( R. 307).
Exhibits 13, 14 and 15 show only that the arr
signal is not visible when the left wheels of an auti'"
4

t to the rear of the bus are further
100 f ee
. . than are the left wh ee ls of th e bus. ( R.
'"t
rig-nt
...
1

"i "
'·'

ARGUMENT
POINT I
1

RE rs SCFFICIE~T EVIDENCE OF NEGLI~ .r,~.E0"
PART or DEFE~DA~T'S DRIVER
_:j; :~T.~I:\' THE JCRY VERDICT IN FAVOR OF
1
,,.,." ~LAl\'TIFF A.s'D THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
1
.~~: ;\. REFl"SI.s'G TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR

THE

~;:£ ~EFE:\'DA~'T.
The trial court submitted the following issues
, Jefrndant's negligence as alleged by the plaintiff
:. :ht .iury for their determination:
1. That the bus was brought to a stop with0ut a proper or ,-isible signal; that either the
,!efendant's driYer did not signal or because
,1f the condition of the signal lights the signal
w:.s not risible to the driver of the automobile
in which plaintiff was riding.
~. That the driver of said bus failed to exer,·iSt> reasonable care to keep a proper lookout
t 1 the rear of said bus to observe automobiles
fn!l.c.wing and particulal'ly the automobile in
which the plaintiff was riding.

:J. That the driver of said bus stopped the
sa.me on a traveled portion of the roadway
w1thClut pulling off to the side. ( R. 59 - 60).
l',

R~garding the first allegation, Section 41-6-69
l.C.A.. 1953 provides as follows:

?o person sh~ll stop or suddenly decrease the
speed of a vehicle without first giving an ap5

propriate signal in tht· manner })l'O\- 1 ,
· t
·
·
I< t"U n ·
m
o t he <ll'l\"el'
o.f any \'eh1cle
in1111ed1a
·::-:
rear when then· i:-; opp<wtunit\' to _t<".,.
signal."
·
![l\t ~'..t
· .•..••
Section 41-6-70(b), C.C.A., 1~5;{ l'"l1u
' 1 11•',' LJ1a: ·
hicles. of th: length of defendant's hu~ gire
a:propnate signal by means of signal lamp:; ,,f .. _
type approved by the State Road Commission. Pla,.
tiff does not contend that the brake lights un :..
fendant's bus were not of the type approred hr.,
l•""
State Road Commission, but does contend that e.nr.,
( 1) defendant's dri\·er did not make an "apprr.pr.
ate signal" of his intention to stop, 01· (2) ht d;"
not keep the signal lights clean enough to affo,,
reasonably adequate illumination to the rear. [)...
fendant's dri,·er admits that he gave no ann ar. 1:
hand signal of his intention to stop (R. 163). T~..
evidence is inconclusive as to whether or not sue'
a signal could have been seen by the d1i,·er of tJ:,
automobile in which plaintiff was riding if it hJ,:
been gi,·en ( R. 298).

th;

The giving of an "appropriate signal'' of 11n,'~
intention to stop, whether by arm and hand '.'ipt.
or by means of brake lights which are actuated h·.
depressing the brake pedal as were the brakt' ligr:t~
on defendant's bus, must be made in advance of tht'
time the stop is commenced in order to afford :if:\
warning of the contemplated stop. Our Utah statutr
was thus construed by the Tenth Circuit Court 11f
Appeals in enited States vs. First Sec11rity Ban~
6

•
.

.. 1 "tis F.2d -!2-1, (10th Cir. 1953) wherein
111 '. - c
~ [;!

'
t t' (I ''lt 11age

•·J".

"i-;' ·

..
It is urged that the visible light showing
d·ll: 'application of v(~rn.on's brakes complied
\\'Itll the statute. A fair mfe1:ence to ~e d~~a~n
fr 11 m tht:> testimo.ny of _Mardis 3:nd his wi~e is
:i~~H the brake light sig:ial whicl~ was given
h\· tht· \'ernon automobi!e was simultaneous
\\'-;L) 1 it:-: :-;udden dPcrease m speed. Under such
L"ircun1;-;tances. the signal was not effective
:rnd was not in compliance with ~he st~tute
·,rhich pnn·idPs t~at an ap:Rropriate s'l.gnal
11 ust bt:> g-in,n pno;- to stopping or suddenly
;lecn·asin'g thespeed of a vehicle." (Emphasis
:1ddt:>d ).

in Jnl11u·w11 i·s. Hill, 27-1 F.2d 110 (8th Cir.
J!lfit1\ a near!~· identical statute of North Dakota
,ra~ ('t1nsi1!t>red by the court in the following langu\i:-11,

"\\'t.· first take up the question of Johnson's
:wgli.!!l'nct>. In North Dakota the driver of a
1!1ntor whicle is under a statutory duty not
~,, stop or suddenly decrease the speed of his
rt>hicle 'without first giving an appropriate
~ignal in the manner prm·ided herein to the
drin'r of any \·ehicle immediately to the rear
w!'!en then• is opportunity to give such a signal.' Section 39-1038 of the North Dakota
Supplement. Section 39-1039 of the North
qakota s~atute. pro\·ides that a stop signal
s.1all be given either by means of the hand and
arm or by a signal lamp or mechanical device.
In construing nearly identical statutes of Utah
~nd :\linnesota, under facts analogous to the
mstant situation, it was held that a jury ques-

7

tion was presei:ted as to whether th.- .
of the lead vehicle had warned th ili- 1 or: ·
vehic.le followi~g .closely bt>hind b\: a ~.~ •·
ate signal, .of his mtent10n to stop;)!'~~~·
decrease his speed. (Au th. Cited)
··
It is to be noted that gi,·ing a signal i:- n'" ..
sufficient statutory compliance. It must ht. ~r~~
propriate signal .... "
··
The reasoning behind such statutes is S\at.in Benson vs. Hoenig, 37 N.\V.2d -122 (Minn.19t·
at page 4·25:
". . . As pointed out in the ChristellS(>n ('1..
the theory underlying such a statuu- b ::_
the knowledge of a dri,·er of a car to thf' ~
of the presence on the highwav of a car f ·:·
ward is not in itself adequate· to enabi.:- '.i!'..
to guard against a rear-end collision ii :.:·
forward car should stop suddenly witht~~·
warning, and that a warning would enahr
the car in the rear to guard against the ~:
by bringing his car to a stop with the fol""l.'".
one."
In a somewhat later Minnesota case, Ryan i·s. Gr··
.fin, 62 N. W. 2d 504 ( 1954) the plaintiff ariw·
sued as defendants the drivers of the two p~
automobiles for personal injuries he sustained a: l
result of a three car rear-end collision. ~ :r~
court dismissed the case against the first drirer ~
directed a verdict in favor of the second driver~
the ground that the plaintiff was contfibuUr-!
.
!f
negligent as a ~atter .of law. for havtng run~
the second car immediately m front of her..
Minnesota Supreme Court re,·ersed and remaD1'
8

l'ast' for a nt'w trial. Regarding the reciprocal
iutii's 1lf the leading and following drivers, the
Jiui1 :;tatt>d as page 507:

:'.lt'

.., .. Then• are reciprocal duties on the part
,1f a driw•r of a leading automobile and the
!rin•r 11f a car following. Each must exercise
due can.>, must kel'p his vehicle under reasonablt c11ntrol, must ch·ive at a speed which is
1· .. as11nablti and proper under the circumstanct:>~. must gi' e due regard to the right of the
!ltht>r, and in general must so operate his auto1n11bilt a=- to an>id unnecessary collision with
tht' 11tlwr. The driver of a leading automobile
has nu absolute legal rights superior to the
driw·r c 1f the car following. The leading driver
n:u:--t t>wrcise due care not to swerve, slow up,
nr stop \\·ithout adequate warning of his intenti1n1 to d11 so to the driver of the car following. The dri,·er of the car following must
t'Wrcise due care to a\·oid collision with the
leading automobile. Just how close an autonwbilt• may be followed and what precautions
a drin·r must take in the exercise of due care
t11 amid colliding with the automobile ahead
and just what warning the driver of the leading automobile must give in the exercise of
due ~·~ue before swervin&', slo~ing up, or
stopping- cannot be stated m a fixed rule. In
t>ach case, except where reasonable minds may
~nt difft>r, what due care requires and whether
it ha:; been exercised is for the jury. (Emphasis added).
·

. In each of the foregoing cases the facts differed
~hghtly as to the speed, distance between autonio:-i:l~. and ,·arious other factors, i.e., in the First
9

Security Bank of l 'tah ea~w tht· autonwhiit·~ .,,.,
traveling at a high rate of spt•t•d, in tht H1 11 .~ 1 ,,, l l..
they were going slowly in a funt ral pn1<'t>ssii·n. a.r
in the Ryan case they were going at a m11dt'rate ra::
of speed, approximatt•ly 20 milt•s per huu1; h11w.·..
in each case the re,·iewing Court fuund thar :;.
questions of negligence, contributor~· llegiigt>ntt. ar.
proximate cause we1·e, or should ha,·t· bttn. !''•'·
erly submitted to the jury.
1

In the instant case, defendant's driwr arlm:m...
that he gave no arm signal and indicates that ht .:.
not actuate the brakes, and thereby tht' brake iig~:·
at any time before he actually starteri to ~top ··:
163). The only type of a signal which hl' darn>·
have made was a right-turn signal. Such a ~igr.a
was held by this court in Flippen i·s . .l/ilward. l~
Utah 373, 234 P.2d 1053, ( 1951 ') as not et1mp:··
ing with the statutory requirements of gi,·ing a P~ 1 •
per signal of intention to stop. In that east> the piair.·
tiff was struck from the rear when she slowed dow:-.
to make a turn. She stated she signaled f0r :~·
turn, but not for the slowing or stopping. Or. :b
point the court through Justice \\"ade stated:
"By her own testimony she did not gire a_1;
appropriate signal for such a!'l e\·ent. "re~ :·
a hand signal could be seen m such a <lfll"'
fo~, for she testified she si~alt>d .s~e ::
gomg to turn and did not testify tha. ~he · ~.
naled she was going to slow down nr .:>ttW
Also, in Sfltrdavant vs. Corington. :3 Vtah 2d :~
'l77 P.2d 814, ( 1954) the duty of the forward d;:i·
10

.. ,, anticipate the possible nec~ssi_ty of stopping
..··ti· -~t><l. In that case the plamt1ff was the for• .i.:- t scu~
.d
.k.
who stopped suddenly to avo1 str1 mg
rare· 1irJ\· ·ai·
~
, ." He rontended that he was relieved from the
·.~-g;,f making an appropriate signal of his inten.--.~ '.il stop bt>cause the dog suddenly ran in front
. ~im. and abo that because he was going very
. w,r. tht> foilowing driYer, the defendant, should
Jrr p;n11wn that it was likely that the plaintiff
.~r.t swp. Con:"idering these points, the court
:.ltt1J:

..... B\' his own testimony, he realized from
'.ht· tim~· he :;tarted up at the intersection that
ill' rlllght ha\·e to stop to avoid striking the
dill! .ind yd he did not give or prepare to give
Jn~· ~ignal of a contemplat€d stop. For a distanrP nf 1:rn feet he drove with the dog runr'.ing ahead of him . . . \Yhile we recognize
~· 1 ml' force in appellant's argument that betause he was traveling ,·ery slowly after he
~tarted up from the intersection the responttent :'hould han.> known that it was likely that
appellant might stop, we do not think that fact
C"an abst)h-e appellant from cont1'ibutory neglig;inre a:; a matter of law."
. In the case at bar, defendant's driver knew
:'iXll thti time the children passengers pulled the
:~r cord as the bus passed the preceeding Coach
':r;j) •' h
"· :ri_at t- would have to stop at the next Coach
--·~ wnere the accident occurred ( R. 187), yet he
1Ai~
n~ appmpriate
~m
. . signal of his intention to stop ,
at Intention was evidently to decelerate from
11

a speed of 30 miles per hnUI· and stop on th .1",
portion of a wet highway without making t :·d.·
.
an.·~)'>.
,·at10ns to the rear for ,·ehicles that mav r ·r1
ing him. The driYer of the automobile in ~rh~~ ': ...
tiff was riding had no forewarning 111. ·1.1..,_r'--ta.\.1f .
ant1c1pate that the bus would stop at tni1- h";r
when it had not stopped at any µri11r iM"1mr~-,::
entering onto State Street (R. 225 - t'26i.
•

•

.

c

The record is quite clear that deft-ndant, ,1:-i
er did not make an appropriate signal 11f hi:; ;:itr•
ti on to stop before the stop comnwnct-n. :\!so. L~r··
is sufficient eYidence on which the jury could L:
that the brake lights wert:> so cowred witn i!Tl~.
and mud that it would have been impossiblt r.1 ir
any type of signal emitted by them at a substar.:..;_
distance to the rear ( R. 200 - 201 & 246). In ri ·~
almost identical with the instant case, Ganv m,.
Dixie Traction Company, 2!3:2 S.W.2d 997. 1K.
1950) the allegation of dirt on the brake ligh~ T.i.·
held sufficient t-0 make a jury question as to the Oi"
fendant's negligence. The Trial Court had din'C'V".
a verdict for the defendant at the conclusion l i.
of the evidence and in reversing this judgment ::..
Kentucky Supreme Court ruled as follows:
1

"Two well defined issues are thus ~~~
the evidence, and these .are whether ~ :r·
was abruptly halted as it apprc~ached ~
tended stop, and. that if the db~eili~;,: :·
stop signal, was it so obscured ~. . of e'-.
could not be seen. \\'hile the weighdence was that there was no ~udden
1:.!

·i thi· bus as it approached the 'Power.House'
ar!d that thl' bus was c_le~n so as its stop
!tl!ht;-; could be set>n, the maJ0~·1ty of the Court
, 11f tlw opinion that the testunony of the ap::ellant C. \\'illiam Ganison, that the bus did
·, 11 thi1t neeasion rnakl' a sudden and abrupt
.::t1•p. and the. testi1111rny of his wi~ness, Mrs.
\'. il~.in. and h1111s1:1lf that the stop signals \Wre
.. , ,,hst·111·t·d by mud that they could not be
,,.,, "·a;-; sufficif•nt to take the case to the
1ur".-: Tht' issues of fact, whether the bus did
··,c ;lid :111\ stop suddenly and whether the stop
.::i~'11:d n·qui1wl by K.R.S. 189.050 was so
i1h..-eun·d hY mud as to render it ineffective
.11 thi~ pai·tieular case, ll'Cre fnr the jl!ry."
1 !:mph.1..:is addt>d)
• 111 p

•·nn·rning plaintiff's second allegation that
:,it~1ri;i!'~·:' 1tri\1·r failt'd to exe1·cise reasonable care
k1:q1 a lo11k(1ut to thP rear, plaintiff does not con"'.'.1: that dt>ft'ndant's dri\·er should have maintained
·:·11n~tant l1iok11ut to the rear, but does contend that
·~ .. •:Xt·rl'ist' 11f reasonable care would require the
·~Jrt'r · f a larg-~· bus to make an observation to the
:>~:r h.:fon. '-'topping the same on the traveled por· ,,!' 1 ·f a prillcipal highway, especially when he knew
~. ,. a t11n~iderable period in adYance that he would
·~ l'.1akin.g a stop at this location. The children
1
Y''tt>d rh ... bus dri,·er as the bus passed the prior
1
n Th :'rnp that they wanted to exit at the next
~:··~ ( P... 187 'i. There is no doubt but that the auto·'1hiit- in \\·hieh plaintiff was riding as a passenger
1
" a• f·•llowing the bus at this time and could have
•-n ~n by the bus dri\·er if he would have looked
l

i

1

l
since he wa..s a~le to see thr automobile a:- .......
he
glanced 111 his side rear-,·iew min(it. upor: ::-,
··
•
mg
the brakes of the automobile im 111 '.... <1i1ate.\1 ,...•
.
impact. (R. 162 - 163 & li5 - li6l.
· ·
This court held in Hayden 1 -.~. r·1(1u. ,.
Utah 2d 171, 26:3 P.2d 796, that it is a jur.. ·.;11___
tion whether or not a forward driver is ~;!:·: .
negligence in failing tu obseri;e traffic oppruacr...
from the rear. In that case the µlaintiff wa.' d ric.~
senger in a truck which was struck fron; the rt~ ..
defendant, a police officer, traveling 45 w :Jo ;n1:,.,
per hour. Any negligence of the truck driw·r ...,.
admittedly imputable to the plaintiff to bar h~ -~
covery. The trial court denied a motion for direr.~
verdict and the jury returned a verdict for the plai;tiff on instructions which included one to the effer
that if they believed that the exerciSt> of due C1"'
required the truck drii;er t-O look to the rear 1)1' :r
the rear-vision mirror to ascertain if there ~I'
vehicles behind him, and such failw·e was a pNc·
mate cause of the collision, he would be guilt)· ..:
contributory negligence and plaintiff could n{lt ~
cover. Howei;er, the trial court granted a :totJ:'
for judgment notwithstanding the rerdict .m ::·
ground that the truck drii;er violated a statutr 1·
hi bi ting a vehicle from turning right or lef: ur~
the roadway unless such moYement could be~
with reasonable safety. This court rerersed anc ~

!

.. .'ung :lw duty to make reas?nable ob~en·ations

· :nt rt>ar

:-;ta ted

through Justice Hneroid:

"..\sidt' frtim statute, whe~her one is ~egligent
in failing to obseiTe traffic approachmg from
•he n·ar, after gi \·ing a proper signal in the
~:rui:wr lane 1 if traffi\. would be a jury questi11n based on the particular facts of each case,
unles:-: reasonable minds could not di ffer as
tn th1· fact of negligence or non-negligence,
_ when re a matter of law would arise."

(\1uld not the jury ha\·e found in the case at
·,_i:· rhat if tht' bus dri\·er had looked in his rear..•. w muTur a~ ht· approached the Coach Stop where
:r.r· ae('iclent occUITed, he would have seen the auto1:1,obdl' in which plaintiff was riding as a passenger
,pprnaching in the same lane of traffic at a con':ant ;;peed, indicating that the driver thereof was
Jr.awan' of the bus dri\·er's intention to stop? The
t1 ~ drirer could han, then taken action to avoid the
.1)liisi1m such as pulling off on to the shoulder of the
~:~hway (which he should have done anyway) or in
:,11[ sroµping at all until the danger of collision had
11a:...~1.

The duty ttl keep a reasonable lookout to the
:'lat is increased when the driver contemplates slowr~ Ill' stopping. In 60 Corpus Juris Secundum, Mo:.ir \'ehicles. Section :301 this duty is stated as fol· 'w~:

''Ge_nerally, a motorist intending to stop his
\"t•h1cle must use due care for his own safety
and for the safety of others, any sudden slowlfl

mg up .•~ay amount to a practical sto' ..
to requu e. the same precauti11ns a~ v...1.uJ,,:
necessary m :ase of an ~ctual stnp. :\i::it~.:·
the duty to use due care m :-:topping ex1.'"~':
dependently
of any
.
'b statutor:v·
. regulat:.,or .
son:ietimes prescn ed b~· regulation that·~·~ ..
~orist may not, except m cast>s of emt>rg:~.
~~?denly decrease his speed. nr stop uni~·'...
fi~ st SC('S that such operation mar !)t' r'
without endangering other traffic.'..\:: a~:,
the .operator should look for whicles 51.1 t~ ..
behmd that they may be impflrile<l by J ~"
den s~op or dec~·e~se of ~peed, and give a p··
per signal of his mtent10n as discu~ i~; ..
subdivision b of this section ... " ( Ernpha:-.
added).
In Scott vs. JfacEfroy, :361 S.\\'. 2d 43"2. (19tt
the Texas Court of Civil Appeals upheld a find:~~
that the plaintiff driYer of the first automobii~ .:
a series of three was guilty of contributory nK~:
gence when he slowed down to fiw miles µt?r ~):·
in contemplation of pulling nff the highway. T::
plaintiff slowed without obse1Ting the defemiar.:··
automobile, which was the third automobiie in li~r
as he passed the second automobile and cullided "':
the rear of plaintiff's auwmobile.
In the case of Richard...;on i·.~. Hm ketr. 1:)4 Sr·
2d 312 (Va. 1964) cited by appellant. the faer.•~~
'
. iff tr~
garding the caution exercised by the plamt . ·
driver who was struck from the rear are~ foilows:

"He looked in his rear-,·iew mirror r~·, ~-
there were any Yehicles following him .1."
16

.;aw nnrw. Tlwreafte1: he began. pumpinq his
l1·vikc .; ,,, n.·tirat~ his brake lzgh! to szrrnal
+•inl J, 1 ,,·as ,..;/011'1t1g down. He did not look
airain fnr traffie behind him." (Emphasis

ariderl ).
i~' :ri:i. euurt non-suited the plaintiff at the con.~;:<i•lf of hi~ 1·\·idence. The Supreme Court of Ap:..,aL~ ,if \"irginia n)\·ersed and held that on the facts
.. arn~ 1 ff truch <lrin•r was not guilty of contribu:. :i· nt>gligenl'.t' as a matter of law, but that his
·w~1 1 gence was a jury question. Certainly this case
, r.•) authority for appellant's proposition in the
:a..'t' at bar that dt"fendant's bus driver was not neg.:~~nt as a matter of law, since he made m> observa:,•.1n tu rear before commencing his stop and did m>t
:1ump his brake pedal to actuate the brake light.
\L;;u. the case of Mack vs. Decker, 128 N.W.2d 455
,\\is. 1964) cited by appellant, wherein the for·,\ard automobile dri,·er was held not to be guilty
::l'digence in failing to exercise a lookout to the rear
r.,ifi,re stopping when he was hit by a motorcycle
·~ \\·hich plaintiff was riding is dinstinguishable
'.· •n; the case at bar on several factual points, i.e.,
: :ht> motorcycle was fallowing two to three times
~· far behind the forward automobile as in the in·'.4n: ease, ( 2) the car was stopped for 25 to 40
v'(.'onds and possibly longer before it was struck from
·nc rear, whereas in the instant case the bus was
':Jl slowing down for its stop at the time of im~t and (3) the automobile made an emergency
'~ at least an uncontemplated stop for children
17

crossing and about
to cross th t' h.1ghwav ir :.
.
of the automobile while in the 1·n~•n
t · ., ··
~ l.<l n "ast- :h.
was indicated at the preceding. Coarh ...~·-lop. . . i>
Re_sponden~ agrees wholehearte<lly with th·.
st~ated m 1Uon·U} vs. Ch risten ...;on, 11 l'.tah ~d: ~
3t>6. ~.2d 34, ( 1960) cited by appellant for :h ;.. _
pos1t10n that the fail~re to _obserw is not tht> p;,,·
mate cause of an accident 1f the drir'"'1·
n·a··i·n
• '
I l~ ' ·
served, could not have a\·oided the ac.'Cident H•
ever, in the instant case, rt>spondent contends::-.;
the jury could reasonably han· found from tnu.
dence that if the bus driver had made an ohser;,.
tion to the rear as he approached the C-Oaeh St,\
he could have avoided the accirlent. He would ha.
seen the following automobile under ei1't'urnst.1r.i1:·
which would indicate that the automobile dr.r·:
was unaware of his intention to stop. The busdr~·t
could then have taken e\·asiw action ::;uch as pul'.ir.i
on to the shoulder of the high\vay or refrain.::.
from stopping until the danger of colhsirr. ~.i:
passed. But, obviously, if one makes no obse!i·ar":
of a potentially dangerous situation. ht- will n,·: :•

able to avoid it.
The third allegation uf defendant'~ negE~:!t
as made by the plaintiff is that defendant':> ur:''
7
was negligent in stopping the bus 110 th~ ~: r.
portion of the highway when he could ha\e
on the shoulder of the highway ..\ppellant col~~
. -11 6-101 .l~'that the requirements of Sectwn ~ , 'in '°'! ~
1953 do not apply to the temporaD :MPP g
!)
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?r:

_ , di:,chargt• passt:>ngers. However, the question
. ·.. ,; whetlwr tht· statute absolutely requires the
. . i::i,·t>r t11 :-;tup on the shoulder of the highway,
·~: wnHhe1· 1>r not it was practical to stop the bus
. ::w :'h• ,uld1•r of tht.· highway since the statute
... ,r, 1hit:- n-hici··s from stopping on the main trav:,.,; portiun of tht' highway only "when it is prac·:i.',il ,r.1p, park. 1H· so leave such vehicles off such
.in i1f hi.!!h wa~·. . . . " Considerable evidence con. .-:::nf! tht· l'onditinn of the shoulder of the highway
,r,: mi· pracricahility of stopping the bus on the
,. 1•. 11!d1·r tlf tht· highway rather than on the traveled
:· rn11n .,f th1· highway was presented to the jury.
fa· Jllry could han• found either under the provi-: in,.; .if thP statute or independent of any statute
·r1at. a~ a mattPr of fact, it was practical to stop
·_;k bu,.; nn tht• shoulder of the highway. It was plain:::~·~ contention during the trial that the Coach
~t11p zon., at this particular location was that area
:nmMliatdy south of the pole bearing the Coach
~: 11 \i markt:>r on the shoulder of the highway where
·_r,., snnulder area widens slightly to the east as
<1 wn 11n tht:> photograph, Exhibit 3, and the Engin.... '... ~ Diagram. Exhibit 10. The shoulder area at
·."is point is approximately nine feet wide (R. 208)
r:ueh would allow sufficient space for the bus, be·~~ t-ight. feet wide ( R. 123), to pull substantially
"· the highway before discharging passengers.
1

Th., plaintiff produced three witnesses who
:•:Kl in the immediate area of the Coach Stop who
19

on ma~y occasions obserYed other buS(>s of n.-.~ ..
ant's lrne stop at this location. These wi · · ·
testi~ied that the buses stopped south ut~7.,,~
bearmg the Coach Stop marker and pulled ann.-r.. ·.
from compl~tely off, t~ halfway off the ni~r.•:
when stopping to receive or discharge pa.t!l:ng•;. '
(R. 216, 218 & 220- 222). Defendant's drirer'1f
tended that passengers could not be disc~·.
the shoulder area because it was too muddv ,....'
fendant's photograph, Exhibit 6. shows a m~. 5~
ing in this very area after the accident wit."::1;·
apparent concern.
Thus, from all of the evidenrP, tht> ju!")·<";;
easily have found that it was practicable and nia.~:·
able for the bus driYer to pull off the highwa1 :
discharge his passengers.
There are a multitude of cases cited a: F
A.. L.R. 583 which hold or imply that the ~·tM
of the practicability or opportunity of lea~ng_~
traveled portion of the roadway when reqwrea ~
statute is a question for the jury. In this conneetw
the Supreme Court of '\'yoming in .lferbaco: "
Blanchard, 105 P.2d 272 (1940) stated:
.. ttJ
"\Ve have not noticed any case ~olamg ~
a driver who stopp~ on the t:~~eled
the highway where it was J>O&'ibl~ anr.t n
for him to ha,·e driven off the pa,eme 'r J'
held free from negligen~~ as ah~a~:r~:
merely because .he testified t Id nave 5i(
at the time realize that he cou
driven off t he roa d·"

fi,
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I

I
1

.\'. tlk l'onclusiun of plaintiff's evidence de·e.~llant wa=' well aware of plaintiff's contention that
:~.
ndrmal stnp zont:' at this Coach Stop was on the
.• t
,·, :udt>r nf tht roadway. If such was not the fact,
•. w;e; peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge
, :, 1 wtwr1' tlw ='top zone was and it offered abso.J:.h !J11 t''·idence to the contrary. Thus, the jury
~.u:i: rt>ry pr11perly conclude that this area was the
~. ·rii..d :'tnp zone used by the bus company at this
.-;-Jion and that defendant's driver was negligent
-. ~tnpµing nn the highway.
Trw mtrt fact that the designation of the Coach

':··:) at s~rno South State Street was adopted by
~~rreem£·nt between Midvale City and the defendant
:111:'~ nvt authorize defendant's driver to stop on the
~~arPlt>d portion of the highway at this point if the
1.··iach Stop area is actually off the traveled portion
.i :ht> highway and was reasonably accessible at
:~t time 11f the accident, which was what the jury
~pparently concluded.

1

Appellant contends in his brief that plaintiff's
~~nd felt it unsafe to turn off onto the shoulder
: :he road. However, this was because he was tra··~~ing approximatelv 30 miles an hour and there
"a.' a danger of hitting trees in the general area
f :he Coach Stop ( R. 242), not because the shoulder
\\"4s muddy.

Regarding appellant's contention that Section
H-&-101. U.C.A.• 1953 regarding the stopping, park21

ing, or leaving vehicles upon the roadw·a\. rJ,,.._
· .
apply since the evidence does not show th~t ~h- J.·
was outside a business or residence di~trif·~~ \' ·t!..... " ~·

be noted that Section .t 1-6-8 ( d) r.C.A .. 19;;:.: .~

fines "Business District" as an area l'ont:Lrun~ .,-

highway when within any 600 ft.et aiong ~ucr. ~;.:·
way at least :300 feet of frontag(• 11n 1Jnt "r [) :.
sides, collectively, of the highway an• used for ri.:..
ness purposes. The Engineer's Dia,g-ram of th1- "!."!
introducd in e\·idence a~ Exhibit 1o. ~how~ :ift..
lutely no business houses of any kind in th .. :-ir..
Subparagraph ( e) of the foreging ~tatute Jffi~~
''Residence District" as any territory l'Ontig-1J< ·1·
to a highway not comprising a busines:' distri·.
when the property on such hig-hway for a d~tar.l\
of 300 feet or more is in thP main improre<i w:::
residences or residences and buildings in ll~ f,~
business. The before-mentioned Engineer's Diagn."
covers a distance of approximatt-ly :~60 feet "r~c:
contains a residence area bounded 0n the nonr. r:
a fence just north of the concret€ block holl't a::·:
on the south by a row of trees south of the orci
house, which area measures approximately 2t~ 1 f-:t·
which would indicate that this is not a rt>Sidr~~
district within the meaning of the statute. Dtiie··
dant offered no evidence to the contrary.
Since plaintiff produced cred~tablt> e.'ideMi;. ~
all three allegations of defendant s negligent\'

1

,

.

, llf fact on which reasonable men could
.
.
.t wa' 1)roper to subnu t such issues to the

. -·~: i:-:-llt'~

... ·

~..i~~·ct\ l

..

J'Ol:\T II
Tiff q:1;u1:1·:\'CE OF THE ACTOMOBILE DRIV. .,- .\\Y. \\ _..\:-; ~OT A:\ l:\TERVENING PROXIM..:i , .\J :'E. m·r A CO:\(TRRENT PROXIMATE
. ,~ I\ ITll THE :\EGLIGE:\CE OF DEFENDANT'S
'\ r1: 1\ ( ..\ 1·s1:\G THE ACCIDE:\T IN QUESTION.

Tht' ca.'t' at bar does not fit the hypothetical
:.i.m,m nlt'ntiuned in Hillyard vs. Utah By-Pro-

'

1 L"tah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287,
'.'.1.i .. 1. ~ l'Jtt·d by appellant, because the truck re:'"ri~! tom tht· llill11ard case was a parked, station,•;: ·1bjt'l't. In the instant case, defendant's bus was
.: .. : m11ring when the collision occurred ( R. 159).
h problem considered by the Hillyard case is that
;rr,irh ari5es when one tort-feasor creates a poten:.:!i1~· dangerous situation and a second tort-feasor
·tf!lmits a negligent act with respect to the poten:.aily dangerous situation already created by the
:~'. tnrt-feasor. In detRrmining whether or not the
ort:.mri act of negligence is such an intervening act
.· r."gligence as to re lie\·e the liability of the first
:.-frasur, the Hillyard case cites with approval the
~~ic:lt written by Professor Bohlen, Fifty Years of
· ......)II Han·. L. Rev. 122 in which he states at
· f.. (t1mpa11 fl.

"!Z,.

I~~:

··Tne earlier of two wrongdoers even though

'.~·~ wrong has nwrely set the stage on which

· .t latter wrongdoer acts to the plaintiff's in23

jury is in most ~u~·~sdictions no k~n
.
ed from respons1b1hty merelv beca ger. ~ ...
ter act of the other wrongdoe ~ tht .;:.
means by which his own miscondr11,... ~. tieti
v.~ .,..
ha1·m f u l. Th e. test has come to be whetfi~;~:
l~te_r. act, which ~·eali~es the harmful ~";.
t1aht1es of the s1tuatwn created b. th· ··
fendant, was itself foreseeable.·· ) t ·r.
\.l

This test was applied by this court in tile H:.
yard case at page 148 where the court met Warr.
ment of intervening negligence in the folio~;
language:
··

".It is unifm~mly affirmed by leading autit,~
ties that this argument would univ~ n.:
if Mr. Ashton's conduct was so unusua..,
out of the ordinary, so unfol"S(leable as~'~
unanticipated from a legal point of vil'l' ...
The acts of following a little too close, drm!'.i
a little too fast for existing conditions, or ~!!'.:
slightly inattentive at a particularly inopportur(
time are committed almost daily upon every higt·
way of the state; and while such conduct cannot&.\ '
should not be condoned, it certainly is not so un:JSllL
or unforeseeable as to make such an act an in:r:·
vening or supervening act of negligence in a rrr·
end collision between two moYing vehicles. The lltl:':tion of intervening proximate cause was p~r
submitted to the jury under the facts •)f thr ~;, '
at bar since the accident arose from thf !IT~ /
causitive factors of a rear-end rollision. This l'>Yt'
noted in the Hillyard case, "Ordinarily the ques:>'.
.
.
the ·urr J:1.
of proximate cause is one of fact for
J·
24

1

f !,_."· for the Court." The following recent
: , • 11 ho!J that the question as to the proximate
~..., a.. •
_.;u.~ of the negligence of a forward. driver ~n a
·~ar-tnd collision between two movmg vehicles
.· •tild bt· submittt>d to the jury: Rose vs. Portland
• 1nt'

l)

r'"(J(ru1n

•r

uTI

Company. 341 P.2d 125 (Ore. 1959),

f)•ic~ /11r. 1·s. Chappel/'.<; Dairy, 298 S.W.2d
.. ~:·. i.Kr. 195i ), Jones rs. Hutchins, 154 N.E.2d 304
.IJ. 19581 and Daly vs. Schaefer, 331 S. W.2d 150
1•

.~I II. l ~60 ).
POINTS III & IV
Tiff TRIAL COCRT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING
·1.~rnn·r10~:-: ~OS.

4 AND 5.

With refere nee to the standard of care set
'.11rth in Instruction No. 4, Paragraph 2, regarding
~, driver's duty to exercise reasonable care to keep
J proper lookout to the rear, the general rule is that
such a duty exists, particularly when the forward
.ir:rer conwmplates turning, slowing or stopping.
Thi~ duty is acknowledged in 60 Corpus Juris Se·wdum, Mowr Vehicles, Section 301 wherein it is
ir.1~!:

"... As a general rule, the operator should
look for \·ehicles so close behind that they may

be imperiled by a sudden stop or decrease of
speed. and giYe a proper signal of his intentwn as discussed infra . . ." (Emphasis
added).

~'le r\idence is susceptible of the finding that if
)uc.~ an obsen·ation had been made by defendant's
25

driver,. he. would h~Y.e seen the automnbdf' :r: 7~
the pl am t1ff was ndmg as a passengi· .
.
. -' appr1·:1r: .
from the rear m such a manner as to makf' i, ,._
to attempt to stop the bus upon thP trarel:~:· ·'
of the highway. Thus, since t:>xerci&- 1tf th;. ·-_
~ight h~ve prevented the injury, the gir.n~ ..f·::·
mstruct10n was proper.
Regarding paragraphs ;3 of Inst111ctior. t:.
language of Section 41-6-101, r.C.A. 1~5:~ im~""
no greater duty than would exist under rnrr.~.
law since an ordinarily prudent person wflula:
stop in the traffic lane of a principal highwa1 ·~
was practical to pull off the highway and omo ::.
shoulder area. The statute only prohibits stopp1:.r
on the traveled part of a highway "when it i~ pr:.·
tical to stop, park or so leave such \'ehicle of~
part of said highway." (Emphasis added). Tilt~
fore, whether under the statute or independen: ::
any statute, the same ultimate question would har·
been presented to the jury - was it, or was ii'
practical for defendant's bus driwr to st•)P ..ff::«
highway on the shoulder area. In Yiew of tnt' ~·.·.
dence that other driYers of defendant'5 compan! :..·
ways stopped on the shoulder area at this part~:~
Coach Stop and the evidence regarding the C1mtt.J"
of the shoulder on this occasion, the jury was J~t
fied in finding that it u•a.B practical to s~ 00 :::
he 1r.s.""j.
•
shoulder of the highway and therefore t
tion was properly given.
26
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i

r
:-::ice defendant did not request any instruc. ··r.~ incorporating the definitions mentioned in
~,,·:i·•O:' .tl-6-~• & 10, C.C.A., 1953 he cannot now

·'·'" :>uch an ohjPCtion.
Tht· trial court committed no error in giving
, ,·•·1Jcti•lf1 >:o ..) :-;ince an appropriate signal is
·..;,~·:;·t•d b;.· ~t>Ction 41-6-69(c), U.C.A., 1953 for
:"I ,top if then· is a \·ehicle immediately to the
, ·. and if thPrt' i~ an opportunity to give such a
, ~.d. The adjPCtivt> "suddenly" applies only to a
i·· :·,·a~· in :-;peed'' which may not ultimately result
~- 1 ~·11mplete :-;top of tht> \·ehicle. A fair inference
_.m~ tn t)(l that any actual stop, particularly from
";r1:'rnntial ~pt·erb on heavily traveled highways,
·.. 1uld rrsult in sufficient deceleration to require
,'•mpliancr with the statute. In this case, defendant's
-·u~ dt>et>lerated from at least 30 miles an hour to
·1;akf. a stop with an automobile following within
: 11 " ft>t>t at approximately the same speed on a wet
~.ie-r.way. Certainly it cannot be said as a matter of
.a\\· that such a signal was not required when the
:>,1:- driver had ample opportunity to make an appro'11·iatt: :::.ignal as required by the statute.

CONCLUSION
Respondent and plaintiff below presented cre•:::able e\·idence of the negligence of defendant's
ilr:i·tr with respect to his failure to give an appro~ir:att> signal of his intention to stop, to exercise
·wa..'<lnable care to keep a lookout to the rear, and
'27

stopping on the traveled portion of th ·, "
t:' h.~.. t
. .
w h en con d itions were such that he could hav: ,, .
ped on t~e should.er of the highway. The PVj 1~."
was admittedly disputed as to the last aLit 3 ...
but as to plaintiff's first two allegations ,} ~,.
gence, defendant's driver admitted not Joo~'.,
the rear before commencing his conwmplated r•.
and not actuating his brake tu give a signal u! .:..
intention to stop before actually starting tu 1~et'fot:
ate. The issue as to whether or not defendant's ,l!'
er was negligent in not pulling onto the snou.1of the highway to stop was clearly a jury 4 ut'S~
Also the issues as to whether or not his faiiui;. ·
look to the rear before stopping, failure to g:r" ;·
appropriate signal of his intention to swp. ani.: ·
dirty condition of the brake lights were prox::::4:
causes of the accident were properly for tile>~
These questions, including the 4uestion as w wr.,~ ·
er plaintiff's husband's negligence Wa.5 tlr ~·r
proximate cause of the accident were submir:eci ·
the jury under proper instructions of the trial.'''.:·
( R. 63 & 68) and the jury returned an unar::I!:"·
verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
A review of such evidence on appeal :n~: :~
made in the light most fanwable to the pia<_='..
which would be ( 1) that the brake lights were ti ......
not actuated before deceleration commenred c·r v:-..
·11 · ~·on to tht
too dirty to provide adequate_ 1 umma,i
·); rei:
;:;:
in the daytime when the accident occur~ (- __
J...~~rvation to i<•
if the bus driver had made an o~

p

, \\\iulJ haYe been appraised of a potentially dan"...ruU' :;ituation and could ha,·e taken steps to avoid
:~~~ ~ident, and ( :~) that the condition of the
.~ilJlder nf the highway did not preclude defend3n:, driwr from stopping thereon in the area where
~t'r drin'rs of defendant's line usually stopped.
WHEREFORE, Respondent prays that the
.~Jgmrnt of the trial court be affirmed and that
.•• tlt' awarded htir costs herein.
RPspectf ully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN

H. \Vayne \Vadsworth
909 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attnnieys fm· Res]J<mdent-Plaintiff
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